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ESSAY
Iraqi Crimes During and After the Gulf




When the victorious allied powers established a special military
tribunal at Nuremberg on August 8, 1945, they reaffirmed an ancient
and peremptory principle of law: nullum crimen sine poena, "no
crime without a punishment."' The court based its sentencing not on
reformation or deterrence, but retribution.2 The Nuremberg court's
use of retribution ensured that the most abominable perpetrators of
international crimes could reasonably expect enforcement of the nul-
lur crimen sine poena principle.
Today, as the world begins to lose sight of major Iraqi crimes
committed both during and after the 1991 Gulf War,3 including
crimes of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity,
4
* Ph.D, Princeton University, 1971. Professor of Political Science and International
Law, Purdue University. Professor Beres is the author of many books and articles dealing
with world politics and foreign policy. He lectures widely in this country and abroad on stra-
tegic matters, and regularly contributes editorials to a number of leading newspapers.
1. In the words of Sir Walter Moberly, "The principle really embodied at Nuremberg
was the principle of retribution. At the time of the trial public opinion in the victorious coun-
tries undoubtedly demanded and acclaimed it. Rightly or wrongly it was felt that, to punish,
was not only allowable and expedient but an imperative duty." SIR WALTER MOBERLY, THE
ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 303 (1968).
2. Id.
3. The official account of the Gulf War is found in U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT
OF THE GULF WAR (1992). Appendix 0 of this document addresses the following issues under
the law of war: hostages; treatment of civilians in occupied territory; targeting, collateral dam-
ages and civilian casualties; enemy prisoner of war programs; treatment of prisoners of war;
repatriation of prisoners of war; uses of ruses and perfidy; war crimes; environmental terror-
ism; conduct of neutral nations; and "surrender" in the conduct of combat operations. Id.
app. 0. For an excellent policy-centered treatment of these issues, see W. Hays Parks, The
Gulf War.- A Practitioner's View, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 393-423 (1992).
4. Crimes of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity are defined in the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(a)-(c), 59 Stat. 1546, 1547,
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter] as follows:
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this principle once again needs institutionalized jurisprudential sup-
port.5 Such support should derive from the creation of another spe-
cial tribunal or from existing municipal courts used for the
prosecution of Saddam Hussein and his Revolutionary Council.
6
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assur-
ances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the foregoing;
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave
labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages,
or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, depor-
tation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
5. Nullum crimen sine poena is a principle that distinguishes between criminal and non-
criminal law. Without punishment there can be no distinction between a penal statute and any
other statute. See Redding v. State, 85 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Neb. 1957) (concluding that a crimi-
nal statute without a penalty clause is of no force and effect).
6. In view of the obvious difficulties surrounding actual custody of Saddam Hussein and
other Iraqi defendants, some trials may have to be conducted in absentia. According to the
IMT Charter, Annexed to the London Agreement:
The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged with
crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter [crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity] in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal,
for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in
his absence.
IMT Charter, supra note 4, art. 12, at 1548. However, trials in absentia may run counter to
long-settled principles of justice and due process in national and international law. In the
United Nations Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, the
Committee reaffirmed the general principle of law that an accused "should have the right to be
present at all stages of the proceedings." U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 19, U.N.
Doc. A12645 (1953) [hereinafter U.N. Committee Report]. In the Annex to the Report, the
Committee's Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, the rights of the ac-
cused to a "fair trial" include "the right to be present at all stages of the proceedings." Id. at
25. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, signed at Rome on November 4, 1950, also stipulates that everyone charged with a
criminal offense has the right "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing." The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(3)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. 221. The same right is affirmed in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Strictly speaking, of course, anyone
charged with a criminal offense who is offered representation "through legal assistance of his
own choosing" as an alternative to defending himself in person, is being allowed essential
minimum guarantees under law and is not being deprived of due process by trials in absentia.
Id. Similarly, anyone charged with a criminal offense who is offered the opportunity "to de-
fend himself in person," but declines to do so, is not being mistreated under the law. Id.
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II. IRAQI CRIMES DURING THE GULF WAR
During the Gulf War, Iraq committed truly horrendous crimes7
so terrible that they mandate universal cooperation in apprehension
and punishment (crimen contra omnes, crimes against all). 8 These
crimes involve human rights violations under international law such
as: (1) barbarous and inhuman assaults against Kuwaiti citizens and
other nationals in Kuwait; (2) barbarous and inhuman treatment of
coalition prisoners of war in Iraq and Kuwait; and (3) aggression and
crimes of war against noncombatant populations in Israel and Saudi
Arabia.9 One rationale for protection of human rights violations
under international law is that "certain forms of depredations become
matters of international concern when committed under the aegis of
state policy because of the presumed international impact of such be-
7. It is arguable, of course, that the formal protocol of a trial can never be applied
appropriately to overwhelming lawlessness, and that such a trial--contrary to all of the usual
expressions of concern for "justice"-would necessarily be manifestly unjust. In this connec-
tion, prosecution of Iraqi crimes under international law must be understood as a mockery of
civilized law-enforcement, not because of perceived absues of power and legal procedure but
because such judicial "remedy" would create an unfounded appearance of proportionality.
This argument, which holds that in the cases of certain egregious or "truly horrendous"
crimes, e.g., the Holocaust, no amount of judicial punishment can produce justice, and leads
only to the diametrically opposite courses of action: (1) extra-judicial punishment (normally
execution), or (2) leaving the crimes unpunished altogether. The first course of action is unsat-
isfactory because it contains all of the elements of infinite regress (i.e., when if ever is the
amount of extra-judicial punishment finally commensurate with the crime) and because of the
tactical difficulties involved in killing an "adequate" number of perpetrators. Moreover, this
option is plagued by evidentiary issues concerning proper identification of wrongdoers, "prob-
able cause" and "beyond a reasonable doubt." The second course of action is unsatisfactory
because it represents flagrant disregad for expectations of nullum crimen sine poena.
8. The principle of universality is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between
states in the fight against crimes. See 2 HUGO GROTIus, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE bk.
II, ch. 20, sec. 8 (1625); EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. 19 (Charles
G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758). The case for universal jurisdiction (which is strengthened
wherever extradition is difficult or impossible to obtain) is also built into the four Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, which unambiguously impose upon the High Contracting
Parties the obligation to punish certain grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the
infraction was committed or the nationality of the authors of the crimes. Geneva Convention
No.1, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Geneva Convention No. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50,
6 U.S.T. 3217; Geneva Convention No. 3, Aug 12, 1949, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. 3316; Geneva
Convention No. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516. In further support of universality
for certain international crimes, see 2 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 6 (1983). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-04, 443 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984).
9. For an early but authoritative inventory of Iraqi crimes, see John Norton Moore,
War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 403, 410-411 (1991).
See also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON CIVIL WAR IN IRAQ (Comm. Print 1991).
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havior."' 0 However, this rationale is independent of international im-
plications whenever the depredations in question outrage the
conscience of humankind. International law now concedes that limits
to the omnipotence of each state are determined not only by the re-
quirements of international comity, but also by the inherent rights of
each individual person to human life and dignity. All of these viola-
tions under international law, I" of course, are in addition to the origi-
nal crimes against peace committed against Kuwait on August 2,
1990,12 and to the ensuing crimes against humanity in Kuwait be-
tween August 2, 1990, and January 18, 1991.
The United States and its allies must decide on how broadly they
wish to prosecute Iraqi crimes. The special post World War II war
crimes planning group did not have to address this issue, as it focused
primarily on particular Nazi groups that were defined as inherently
criminal (e.g., the SS and the Gestapo). In the Gulf War, however, it
10. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Law in the Processes
of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 193, 194 (1982).
11. The jurisprudential bases of this concession may be found in all of the sources of
international law identified at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
reprinted in MANLEY 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
1920-1942 app. 4, at 677 (1943).
12. For crimes against peace, or waging aggressive war, see Resolution on the Definition
ofAggression. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1975). For pertinent codifications of the criminalization of aggression, see also Treaty
Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46
Stat. 2343, 94 U.N.T.S. 57; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; Declaration on the Inadmissibility
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1966); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. Supp. No. 28 at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); Declaration on the
Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear
Weapons, G.A. Res. 2936, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972); CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Agreement for the Prose-
cution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art.
6, Annex, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Resolution Affirming the Principles of International
Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st
Sess. at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946). See also Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8, 10-11, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (known generally as the
"Montevideo Convention"); Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945, art. 5, 70
U.N.T.S. 237; CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, April 30, 1948, chs.
II, IV, V, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 and Protocol of Amendment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 (known generally as the "Protocol of Buenos Aires"); Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, 121 U.N.T.S. 77
(known generally as the "Rio Pact"); the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, April 30,
1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (known generally as the "Pact of Bogota"); and CHARTER OF THE OR-
GANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, May 25, 1963, arts. II, III, 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
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appears that many of the crimes against humanity committed by Iraq
were unplanned and individually conceived atrocities.' 3 This means
that coalition lists of suspected war criminals could become so large
as to be altogether unusable. Alternatively, coalition prosecution
could focus primarily on Hussein and his leadership elite. This strat-
egy would result in many or all rank-and-file Iraqi criminals avoiding
punishment, but would stand some chance of far-reaching and practi-
cal success. 14
Finally, it should be noted that a coalition agency charged with
creating "another Nuremberg" could adopt the solution favored by
the United States, the former Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France
in 1945. This would involve establishing a special tribunal for the
trial of major criminals (Saddam Hussein and the surviving members
of his Revolutionary Council), while the domestic courts of individual
coalition countries would provide the venue for trials of minor
criminals (ordinary Iraqi soldiers and their civilian Iraqi collabora-
13. This does not mean that individual soldiers could plead "superior orders" in their
defense if these crimes were planned and directed by Iraqi military authorities. The London
Charter, which established jurisdiction and authority for the Nuremberg Tribunal, observed in
Articles 7 and 8 that the tribunal could not consider "superior orders" as absolving defendants
from responsibility. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug.
8, 1945, art. 7-8, 59 U.S.T. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. "The very essence of the Charter is that
individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience
imposed by the individual State. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves
outside its competence under international law." Id. This principle was reaffirmed in 1950
when the United Nations International Law Commission, pursuant to General Assembly Res-
olution 177 (II), adopted November 21, 1947 (by a vote of 42 to 1, with 8 abstentions) formu-
lated the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the
Nuremberg Tribunal. According to Principle IV: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to
order of his Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility under interna-
tional law."
14. The particular liability of Hussein and his ruling associates for crimes committed
under international law is well established in the principle of respondeat superior. Literally "let
the master answer," this principle is the converse of the doctrine of "superior orders," and thus
seeks to ensures that lawful obedience to authority entails no criminal consequences. More-
over, the superior's responsibility extends to where no affirmative orders to commit crimes
have been given. Paragraph 501 of U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE:
FIELD MANUAL 27-10 (1956)-based on the judgment over Japanese General Tomayuki
Yamashita-stipulates that any commander who had actual knowledge, or should have had
knowledge, that troops or other persons under his control participated in war crimes and failed
to take necessary steps to protect the laws of war was guilty of a war crime. Paragraph 510
denies the "act of state" defense to alleged criminals by providing that a person who commit-
ted an international crime remains responsibile even though he may have acted as head of state
or as a responsible government official. Id.
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tors). As in the distinction employed to prosecute Nazi offenses, the
separation of major and minor criminals concerns matters of rank or
position, and would have nothing to do with the seriousness or horror
of particular transgressions. Because the Iraqi crimes make their per-
petrators "common enemies of humankind" under international law,
every country now has the legal right to prosecute these crimes in its
own courts.1 5 In addition, every state has a reciprocal obligation not
to grant asylum to alleged perpetrators of genocide and genocide-like
crimes. States that might grant Hussein asylum (such as Algeria, Tu-
nisia, Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania) would violate binding interna-
tional rules in doing so. 16
III. IRAQI CRIMES AFTER THE GULF WAR
Iraq's crimes did not cease with the end of the Gulf War.' 7 The
15. Traditionally, piracy and slave trading have been offenses warranting universal juris-
diction. Following World War II, however, states have generally recognized an expansion of
universal jurisdiction to include: crimes of war, crimes against peace, crimes against human-
ity, hostage taking, crimes against internationally protected persons, hijacking, sabotage of
aircraft, torture, genocide, and apartheid. For the most part, this jurisdictional expansion has
its origins in multilateral conventions, customary international law, and certain pertinent judi-
cial decisions. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared, "The torturer has become-like
the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). One federal district court recognized
that "nations have begun to extend... jurisdiction to... crimes considered in the modern era
to be as great a threat to the well-being of the international community as piracy." United
States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged universal jurisdiction over war crimes in a case involving extradition of a
Ukrainian Nazi to Israel. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985).
Other judicial examples of universal jurisdiction over war crimes include United States v.
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984); and Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 623 F. Supp. 246
(D.D.C. 1985).
16. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 7,
G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 174 (1948); Convention on the Nonapplicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, art. 3, G.A. Res. 2391,
U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., at 40 (1968); Declaration on Territorial Asylum, art. 1(2), G.A Res.
2312, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., at 81 (1967); International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, art. 4(3), G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., at
75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 at (1973); and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Geneva Conven-
tion No. 1, supra note 8; Geneva Convention No. 2, supra note 8; Geneva Convention No. 3,
supra note 8; Geneva Convention No. 4, supra note 8. The provisions of the four Geneva
Conventions stem from the maxim aut dedere aut punire, i.e., either a State must extradite or
make sure that a criminal is punished in its own municipal court proceedings.
17. Coalition military action against Iraqi forces commenced on January 16, 1991. The
war ended when Iraq formally accepted all of the United States-led coalition's terms for a
permanent cease fire on March 3, 1991. Although elimination of all Iraqi nonconventional
force capabilities was an integral part of the cease fire agreement, Iraq continued after the war
680
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Baghdad regime committed vast crimes against humanity upon its
own Kurdish populations. 8 Should these non-wartime crimes be in-
cluded in the indictments under discussion? Soon after the entry into
force of the cease fire agreement, United States President George
Bush and Secretary of State James Baker identified these crimes as
actions falling under the category of "domestic jurisdiction."'1 9
However, according to Article 1 of the Genocide Convention:
"The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law
which they undertake to prevent and to punish. ' 20 This does not
mean, however, that the creation of appropriate tribunals would be
contingent upon Iraqi crimes being authentic instances of genocide as
defined at the Genocide Convention. Rather, such creation would
still be appropriate with "genocide-like" crimes that derive from other
sources of international law.
In addition, notwithstanding the traditionally expressed preroga-
tives of sovereignty, a state no longer has the right to claim itself the
sole judge in matters involving crimes against humanity. 2' These are
to seek a thermonuclear weapons capacity and to disguise this effort from United Nations
inspectors.
18. It is essential to understand that the Kurds, under international law, certainly have
had the right to use force in rebellion against the Saddam Hussein regime. Although specially-
constituted United Nations committees and the United Nations General Assembly have re-
peatedly condemned acts of international terrorism, they exempt those activities that derive
from "the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colo-
nial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and the legitimacy of their strug-
gle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United
Nations." Report of the Ad Hoc Committee On International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973); Resolution On The Definition Of Aggression,
G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
Article 7 refers to the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28,
at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). For a comprehensive and authoritative inventory of sources
of international law concerning the right to use force on behalf of self-determination, see Aure-
liu Cristescu, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Develop-
ment on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, E/CN.4/Sub. 2/404/Rev. 1, United Na-
tions, New York, 1981.
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
16, art. 1.
21. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 71 (1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (This Convention should be read in conjunction with the
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now authoritatively understood as matters of "international concern."
In contrast to the principle of "domestic jurisdiction," which recog-
nizes a reserved domain within which a state can act at its own discre-
tion, "international concern" recognizes limits on this domain
compelled by matters of absolutely overriding importance.2 2 A state's
demand for exclusive competence must be grounded in far more than
a declared interest in avoiding "intervention."
Therefore, within the current system of international law, exter-
nal decisionmakers, in this case United States and other coalition
leaders, are authorized to intercede in matters that may have at one
time been regarded as "internal." This trend in authoritative deci-
sion-making toward an expansion of the doctrine of "international
concern" falls outside of Lauterpacht's definition of intervention.
Intervention is a technical term of, on the whole, unequivocal con-
notation. It signifies dictatorial interference in the sense of action
amounting to a denial of the independence of the State. It implies
a demand which, if not complied with, involves a threat of, or re-
course to, compulsion, though not necessarily physical compul-
sion, in some form. 2
3
We can see that intervention is not always impermissible, 24 and
that any assessment of its lawfulness must be contingent upon intent.
Applying Lauterpacht's standard, where there is no interest in exert-
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 2198, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., at 48,
U.N. Doc. A/6586 (1966) (entered into force October 4, 1967)); Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, March 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature, March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 220, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969. O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36 at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.
L/V/II. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force, July 18,
1978). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol of 1976), and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-known collectively as the International Bill of
Rights-serve as the touchstone for the normative protection of human rights.
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. See also Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex 1, No. 28, at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, supra note 12.
23. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950).
24. For an informed discussion of intervention and "domestic jurisdiction," see Louis
HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS ch. 4 (1990).
Iraqi Crimes
ing "dictatorial interference," the act of intervening may represent
the proper enforcement of pertinent legal norms.25 This concept of
intervention greatly transforms the exaggerated emphasis on "domes-
tic jurisdiction" that has been associated improperly with individual
national interpretations of Article 2(7) of the United Nations
Charter. 2
6
The importance of the changing doctrine of "intervention" to the
shift in global "allocation of competence" was prefigured by the Tu-
nis-Morocco case before the Permanent Court of International Justice
in 1923 ("Permanent Court").27 In this case, the Permanent Court
stated that whether or not a matter is essentially within the "domestic
jurisdiction" of a particular State "depends upon the development of
international relations. ' 28
Although this test is hardly free of ambiguity, it does clarify that
the choice between "international concern" and "domestic jurisdic-
tion" is not grounded in unalterable conditions of fact, but rather in
constantly changing circumstances that permit a continuing adjust-
ment of competences. This means that whenever particular events
create significant violations of human rights, the general global com-
munity is entitled to internationalize jurisdiction and to authorize ap-
propriate forms of decision and action.
Where conditions are judged to permit "humanitarian interven-
tion," the general community "may enter into the territory of the de-
faulting state for the purposes of terminating the outrage and securing
compliance with a minimum international standard of human
rights."' 29 This doctrine of humanitarian intervention echoes Edwin
M. Borchard's prior formulation in 1915:
[W]here a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain
rights of its own citizens, over whom presumably it has absolute
sovereignty, the other states of the family of nations are authorized
by international law to intervene on grounds of humanity. When
these "human" rights are habitually violated, one or more states
may intervene in the name of the society of nations and may take
such measures as to substitute at least temporarily, if not perma-
25. Id.
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
27. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), 1923 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 4 (Nov. 8).
28. Id.
29. MYRES McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE
BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 239 (1980).
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nently, its own sovereignty for that of the state thus controlled.
Whatever the origin, therefore, of the rights of the individual, it
seems assured that these essential rights rest upon the ultimate
sanction of international law and will be protected, in last resort,
by the most appropriate organ of the international community.30
Ironically, the United Nations, which is responsible for most of
the post-Nuremberg codification of the international law of human
rights, has sometimes been associated with increased limits on the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. These limits flow from the
greatly reduced justification for the use of force in the Charter system
of international law, especially the broad prohibition contained in Ar-
ticle 2(4).31 However, one must understand that the Charter does not
prohibit all uses of force and certain uses are clearly permissible in
pursuit of basic human rights. Notwithstanding the drafters' at-
tempts to centralize the legal processes of world politics, the Charter
system has not impaired the long-standing right of individual states to
act on behalf of the international legal order. In the absence of effec-
tive central authoritative processes for decision and enforcement, the
legal community must continue to require humanitarian intervention
by individual states.
Notwithstanding the basis for humanitarian intervention, by late
summer 1992 the United States, Great Britain, and France, acting on
behalf of the United Nations coalition, agreed to limit such interven-
tion in Iraq to declarations of "no fly zones." Designed essentially to
protect abused Shiite populations in the southern part of the country,
these declarations fell short of what was required and sanctioned by
the international law of human rights. Moreover, they did nothing to
bring Hussein into jurisdiction for prosecution.
This is the crux of the problem of punishing Iraqi crimes. The
30. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 14 (1915).
31. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U. N. CHARTER art. 2, para.
4.2. While one cannot deny that humanitarian intervention might be used as a pretext for
aggression, it is also incontestable that a strictly literal interpretation of Article 2(4) would
summarily destroy the entire corpus of normative protection for human rights-a corpus that
is coequal with "peace" as the central objective of the Charter. Moreover, in view of the
important nexus between peace and human rights, a nexus in which peace is dependent upon
widespread respect for human dignity, a strict interpretation of Article 2(4) might impair the
prospects for long-term security. Id. "The use of armed force in defense of human rights may
be emphatically in the common interest as a mode of maintaining international peace and
security." McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 29, at 241.
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rules of extradition cannot operate while Hussein remains in control
of Iraq, so would-be prosecutors must rely upon forcible abduction to
bring him to trial. Optimally, such abduction would take place in
concert with more general interventionary relief for Kurdish or Shiite
populations, but would also be permissible and distinctly legal on its
own.
There is, in view of Nuremberg, absolutely no question that Hus-
sein, his civilian officials, military officers, and even enlisted personnel
are personally subject to trial and punishment for pertinent crimes. 32
The solution of forcible abduction for trial is acceptable according to
certain major writings of highly-qualified scholars. According to Vat-
tel, for example: "if a prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives
his subjects a lawful cause for resisting him, any foreign power may
rightfully give assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its
aid."'3 3 What are the limits of such aid? Vattel continues: "As for
those monsters who, under the name of the sovereigns, act as a
scourge and plague of the human race, they are nothing more than
wild beasts, of whom every man of courage may justly purge the
earth."3
4
Forcible abduction is not an unknown remedy in international
law.35 Although great care must be taken not to violate peremptory
human rights, if extradition is not a viable option the only alternative
may be to leave major crimes unpunished.
In addition, forcible abduction is not a new concept. Israel, in
1960, abducted Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann from Argentina
on charges of Nuremberg-category crimes. 36 In 1985, a United States
military aircraft forced down an Egyptian aircraft over international
waters on the grounds that the Egyptian plane held accused terrorists
32. On the matter of personal criminal liability, see William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg
Precedent and the Gulf War, 31 VA. J. INT'L. L. 391 (1991).
33. VAT-rEL, supra note 8, bk. II, ch. 4, at 13.
34. Id. at 132.
35. See John Quigley, Enforcement of Human Rights in US. Courts: The Trial of Persons
Kidnapped Abroad, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 59-80 (Mark Gibney ed., 1981); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction Of A
State Over Fugitives Brought From A Foreign Country By Force Or Fraud: A Comparative
Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427 (1957); Kandy G. Webb, Constitutional And International Law - Inter-
national Kidnapping - Government Illegality As A Challenge To Jurisdiction, 50 TUL. L. REV.
169, 170 (1975).
36. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alter-
natives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 30 (1973).
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in the Achille Lauro affair.37 In 1987, again in international waters,
the FBI lured Fawez Younis, a Lebanese national, onto a yacht and
eventually transported him by force to the United States for trial.
3 8
And on April 2, 1990, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a medical doctor
and a citizen of Mexico, was forcibly abducted from his office by per-
sons answerable to the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") and
flown by private plane to Texas to face charges of kidnapping and
murdering a DEA agent and the agent's pilot.39
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS AND JURISDICTIONAL
CHOICES
If Saddam Hussein and the surviving members of his Revolution-
ary Council are not prosecuted, justice will be defiled and interna-
tional law will be left weak and tragically undermined. Between
August 2, 1990, the date of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and October
29, 1990, the Security Council adopted ten resolutions explicitly con-
demning the Baghdad regime for multiple crimes of the gravest na-
ture.4° These crimen contra omnes would cry out for legal
prosecution even if there had been no authorizing resolutions by the
United Nations Security Council. The prohibition of the now docu-
mented barbarous activities of Iraq against Kuwaitis and other na-
tionals in Kuwait, against coalition prisoners of war in Iraq and
Kuwait, and against noncombatant populations in Israel and Saudi
Arabia is known as a "peremptory" rule of international law-an ab-
solutely binding rule allowing no form of derogation whatsoever.
For the United States, the Nuremberg obligations to bring major
Iraqi criminals to trial are, in a sense, doubly binding. This is because
these obligations represent not only current obligations under interna-
tional law,4 1 but also the obligations of a higher law found in the
37. See generally Gregory v. Gooding, Fighting Terrorism in the 1980s: The Interception
of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 158 (1987).
38. See G. Gregory Schuetz, Apprehending Terrorists Overseas Under United States and
International Law: A Case Study of the Fawaz Younis Arrest, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 499, 501
(1988).
39. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 91 - 712 (U.S. June 15, 1992), which held
that a respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for
violations of this country's criminal laws.
40. For a comprehensive listing of these resolutions and associated pertinent documents,
see Current Documents: Gulf War Legal and Diplomatic Documents, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 281
(1991).
41. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers supra note 12, and IMT Charter, supra note 4. The principles of
international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of
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United States political tradition. By codifying the principle that basic
human rights in war and in peace are now "peremptory," the Nurem-
berg obligations reflect perfect convergence between international law
and the enduring foundation of our American Republic.
Where should the trials be held? Nuremberg had been widely
expected to be a precursor for the establishment of a permanent crimi-
nal court for the prosecution of international crimes.42 Yet, even to-
day, no such court has been created. Contrary to common
misconceptions, the International Court of Justice at the Hague has
absolutely no penal or criminal jurisdiction, and is therefore
unsuitable.
One solution would be to parallel Nuremberg, and establish a
specially constituted ad hoc tribunal within the defeated country's ter-
ritory (probably at Baghdad). Another acceptable (and far more
likely) possibility would be to undertake such proceedings within the
country that had been Iraq's principal victim-Kuwait. Here, the
court could be coalition-wide, as it would be within Iraq, or it could
(depending upon the desired range of indictments) be fully Kuwaiti.
Legal precedent and justification for all of these possibilities can be
found, among other sources, in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Convention"). 43 Article VI
of this Convention provides that trials for its violation be conducted
"by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act
the Tribunal were affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly as Resolution Affirmating the Prin-
ciples of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res.
95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 1144 Doc. A/236 (1946). The U.N. General Assembly next
made Resolution 177 (II), adopted November 21, 1947, directing the U.N. International Law
Commission to "(a) Formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft code of
offenses against the peace and security of mankind .... " U.N. Doc. A/519, at 112. The
principles formulated are known as the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Char-
ter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 127, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp.
No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1946) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles].
42. The origin of the idea of an established international criminal court is embedded in
the First Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 19, 1899,
32 Stat. 1779, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2d) 720. For development of this idea, see
generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International
Criminal Court in New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992);
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNi, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987) [hereinafter CRIMINAL DRAFTS]; Sym-
posium, Draft International Criminal Court, 52 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL
[R.I.D.P.] 331 (1984).
43. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 16.
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was committed, or by any such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction. '"44
From a strictly jurisprudential point of view, crimes of war,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity are offenses
against humankind over which there is universal jurisdiction and a
universal obligation to prosecute. But, in this case, it is the United
States, for many reasons, that should now take the lead in prosecution
of major Iraqi criminals. These reasons include the special United
States role in military operations supporting the pertinent Security
Council resolutions, the historic United States role at Nuremberg in
1945, and the long history of United States acceptance of jurisdic-
tional competence and responsibility on behalf of international law.
As noted by the Sixth Circuit in 1985 in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,
"The law of the United States includes international law" and "inter-
national law recognizes 'universal jurisdiction' over certain of-
fenses."' 45 The United States Constitution 46 and a number of court
decisions 47 make all international law, conventional and customary,
the supreme law of the land. And the Nuremberg Tribunal itself ac-
knowledged that the participating powers "have done together what
any one of them might have done singly."
'48
Finally, in exercising its special responsibilities under interna-
tional and municipal law concerning prosecution of egregious Iraqi
crimes, the United States already has the competence to prosecute in
its own federal district courts.49 The legal machinery for bringing
Hussein and his fellow criminals to justice is already well-established
under international and United States law. Therefore, what is imme-
diately needed is the political will to make this machinery work.
50 If
44. Id. art. 6.
45. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
46. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
47. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). For a general discussion of these
cases, see FRANCIS A. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1987).
48. Nuremberg Principles, supra note 41.
49. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821; 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988).
50. Regarding such "political will," United States Senator Al Gore (now Vice-President),
speaking on the fourth anniversary of the founding of the Kurdish city of Halabja, on March
18, 1992, strongly criticized the failure of the Bush Administration's policy toward Iraq and
the Administration's failures to hasten the removal of Iraqi police records documenting crimes
by Saddam Hussein and others. For the full text of this statement, which refers to Hussein's
"genocidal war," see Mass Killings in Iraq. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 49-51 (1992)
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the new President of the United States, preferably in concert with
other coalition partners, can now build upon the important prece-
dents and expectations of Nuremberg, his efforts would represent a
fitting conclusion to the Gulf War.51
V. CONCLUSION
Writing in 1784, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant ob-
served: "Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made,
nothing entirely straight can be built." 52 Today, perhaps more than
ever before, the validity of the philosopher's observation is affirmed by
the almost limitless cruelty taking place throughout the world.
Whether it is in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Cambodia, Lebanon,
or South Africa, just to name a few, the willful capacity of human
beings to bring death and torture to others is well documented. In-
deed, the systematic and barbarous extinction of vast numbers of peo-
ple has become the ironic legacy of our post-Holocaust and post-
Nuremberg world order.
Where was international law? Where is international law? Cre-
ated over the millenia, as an authoritative body of norms that would
mediate between civilization and chaos, the law of nations has typi-
cally been immobilized, content with a history that swallows up in-
nocents without even a glance at treaties or other binding
expectations. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that those who
commit or prepare to commit Nuremberg-type crimes pay scant at-
tention to international law. How could it be otherwise?
Yet there is a remedy! Beginning with the egregious and ongoing
crimes of Hussein, various national governments, acting on behalf of
our decentralized system of international law, must now take the nec-
essary steps toward effective prosecution. 53 The result would not be a
51. In this connection, such efforts would give effect to the peremptory expectation of
nullum crimen sine poena. Here Plato's view is instructive. Thinking of vice, the source of
crime, as an ailment of the soul (in the fashion that physical disease is an ailment of the body),
Plato recommended punishment to restore order in the soul. The criminal, therefore, derives a
positive benefit from punishment. Discarding the claims of retributivism, Plato contended that
punishment is just and good only to the extent that it serves the common good by advancing
human welfare. Punishment is meant to turn others from vice and teach virtue.
52. The original German is: "Aus so krummen Holze, als woraus der Mensch gemacht
ist, kann nichts ganz Gerades gezimmert werden." IMMANUEL KANT, GESCHICHTE IN
WELTBURGERLICHER ABSICHT (1784).
53. These steps must begin with the fulfillment of each state's peremptory obligation to
search for and bring into custody and to initiate prosecution of or to extradite those persons
who are reasonably accused of crimes of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against human-
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straightening of humankind's "crooked timber," but the subjection of
our harm-inclined species to elementary rules on international justice.
A more immediate result, of course, would be an end to genocidal and
near genocidal harms still being inflicted on Iraq's Kurdish
populations.
5 4
"The real aim of punishment by human beings," says Samuel
Pufendorf, "is the prevention of attacks and injuries."' 5 In this aim,
"punishment seeks the interest of the victim, which is that he should
not suffer the same thing again either from the same man or from
others."' 56 Understanding Pufendorf, the prosecution of Iraqi crimes
committed during and after the Gulf War would contribute impor-
tantly to the prevention of future crimes of war, crimes against peace,
and crimes against humanity.
7
ity. See, e.g., CRIMINAL DRAFTS, supra note 42, at 110. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Univer-
sality and the Responsibility to Enforce International Criminal Law: No US. Sanctuary for
Alleged Nazi War Criminals, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 337 (1989).
54. Extraordinary documents dating back to 1988 and 1989, the worst years for Iraq's
Kurds, were spirited out of Iraq in May and June 1992. These included 14 tons of paper,
audio and film record interrogations, torture sessions, and executions. See Patrick E. Tyler,
US. to Help Retrieve Data on Iraqi Torture of Kurds, N. Y. TIMES, May 17, 1992, at 3; Amy
Kaslow, Documents Give Evidence of Atrocities Against Iraqi Kurds, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, June 10, 1992, at 1, 4.
55. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DuTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO
NATURAL LAW 159 (James Tully ed. & Michael Silverthorne trans., 1991).
56. Id. at 160.
57. Sadly, it is already too late for the victims of "ethnic cleansing" in the death camps of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Arguably, more expeditious prosecution of Iraqi crimes would have
had a deterrent effect on the crimes in former Yugoslavia. But while the United States and
other countries have indicated an unwillingness to use military force except to insure the flow
of relief supplies, former Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger still called for a
war crimes investigation. At the moment, however, it appears that the political will to proceed
to appropriate tribunals is lacking. See R.W. Apple, Jr., State Department Asks War Crimes
Inquiry into Bosnia Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at Al, A6.
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